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ABSTRACT
The 1986 doctors' strike in Ontario brought into stark 
relief many of the issues that have been latent in 
Canadian health politics for several decades. In this 
paper, an analysis from a sociological perspective is 
offered of the issues involved in the 1986 doctors' 
strike. Issues are discussed in light of the history of 
medicare in Canada, the social structure of medicine 
and its practice in Canada and the political centrality of 
access to health care as a right. Throughout the 
paper, health care is defined as a central social con­
cern, basic to environmental health and well-being.
L 'O ntario  fait face au x  p ro b lem es des services  
m edicaux
La greve menee par les medecins de I'Ontario en 1986  
a etale au grand jour plusieurs problemes touchant la 
politique canadienne sur les services medicaux qui, 
pendant bien des annees, etaient demeures dans 
I'ombre. Le present article etudie ces problemes d'un 
point de vue sociologique et tient compte de I'histoire 
des services medicaux, de la structure sociale et de la 
pratique de la medecine au Canada et du droit, recon- 
nu par tous, a I'acces de ces services. Tout au long de 
cet article, les services medicaux sont decrits comme 
etant un element social de haute importance dont 
dependent la sante et le bien-etre de la population.
The summer of 1986 was a hot one in Ontario. Doc­
tors' offices and the emergency rooms of several hos­
pitals were closed, not by employees demanding a 
living wage, but by the highest paid professional group 
in Canada - physicians. Ontarians who had come to 
rely on universal health care paid for by provincial 
health insurance, were faced with the frightening 
spectre of a health care system gone terribly awry. 
Questions arose about whether health care would be 
available when needed most.
The front pages of Ontario’s newspapers were 
dominated during the summer by headlines about the 
doctors' strike. The plight of patients seeking em ergen­
cy treatment being turned away from hospitals were 
chronicled. The public witnessed the unlikely spectacle 
of doctors in white coats picketing at Queen's Park, 
handing out leaflets from behind a bank of bedpans. 
Editorialists offered opinions on the dispute and the 
Ontario Medical Association bought full page adverti­
sements in an attempt to explain its point of view to the 
public. Yet, what seemed to loom longest in the strike 
were questions. The public seemed not to understand 
why such a vital service as health care was being with­
drawn by doctors. They had further questions about 
how this situation had come to be.
The issues involved in the 1986 Ontario doctors’ 
strike are complex indeed. The strike is one event in 
the long evolution of health care in Canada. It emerged 
out of historical tensions and assumptions about what 
the Canadian health system is and ought to be, on the 
part of the central players. The strike was also a social 
phenomenon, reflecting the social, economic, political 
and ideological underpinnings of the practice of medi­
cine in Canada. These aspects, too, have deep histori­
cal roots. The strike, as well, highlighted to doctors, 
politicians and the public, the centrality to Canadians of 
health care as a right. In this paper, a sociological ana­
lysis of the issues involved in and highlighted by the 
1986 doctors' strike is offered. Throughout, health 
care access and quality are seen as basic to personal 
and environmental well-being of Canadians.
THE EMERGENCE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA
Monique Begin, under whose Ministry of Health leader­
ship the pivotal 1984 Canada Health Act was passed, 
has suggested that "Canada is the Sweden of the 
Americas" (Begin, 1986:79). By this, she means that 
Canada's level of "safety-net" social programs is more 
developed than in the United States. In particular,
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Canada legislated universal government-sponsored 
health insurance in 1966 (Naylor, 1982:12). It came 
into effect in 1968 and has operated with full provincial 
participation since 1971 (Naylor, 1982:12). The idea 
behind Canadian government health insurance is "the 
elimination of financial barriers to health care" (Mar- 
mor, 1986:444).
Although the Canadian health care system is vie­
wed by some, most notably by those in the United 
States, as an example or a model of what Americans 
term "socialized medicine" (Begin, 1986:80; Marmor, 
1986:444), this perception indicates more about the 
differences in political culture between the two coun­
tries than it does anything about the Canadian health 
care system. Relative to most capitalist countries, with 
the U.S. as the exception, state involvement in finan­
cing personal health care in Canada came late 
(Swartz, 1987:571). Hospital insurance was only provi­
ded in 1958 and medical insurance not until a decade 
later (Swartz, 1987:571). It should be noted with some 
interest, however, that the Canadian Medical Associa­
tion (CMA) had proposed a plan for health insurance 
as early as 1934 that would be administered by provin­
cial health departments and remove economic barriers 
between doctors and patients (Begin, 1986:86; Naylor, 
1986). Even at this early date, the CMA argued for the 
right to bill wealthier patients higher fees. In a 1944  
Gallup poll, 80 percent of Canadians favoured a com­
prehensive health care plan (Taylor, 1987:73). In con­
trast to Canada's relatively late arrival on the health 
insurance front, Britain has had National Health Insu­
rance since the end of World W ar II, with Sweden and 
many countries in Western Europe also having early 
programs.
In Canada, health insurance emerged out of the 
problems faced by industrial workers in gaining access 
to health care (Swartz, 1987:572), although the com­
monly held image is that health insurance was first 
introduced by the Saskatchewan C CF-N DP govern­
ment in 1960 after the famous Medicare Election. This 
view accounts for the popular misperception that 
health insurance resulted from progressive legislation 
introduced over the vocal opposition of doctors. The 
realities of the emergence of health insurance and 
relevance to today's situation, tend to be obscured by 
this misunderstanding of the roots of Canadian medi­
care.
Initially, health insurance was provided to workers 
as a fringe benefit seen by employers largely as a way 
of increasing the efficiency of this labour force, or as a 
political benefit to ward off worker unrest (Swartz, 
1987:572). But this form of employer welfare can 
increase the costs of products as well as militancy 
among workers who reject employer paternalism. It 
also was unavailable to the poor who were subjected 
to "charity" medicare. Thus, state involvement in health
insurance became the means of containing  industrial 
unrest and the possibility of workers turning to socia­
lism. Rather than health insurance being a socialist 
program, it seems that it was designed in Canada to 
stem the movement toward socialism during the 
Depression and the forties when growing militancy 
among workers was a reality. W.L. Mackenzie King 
well understood this when he wrote:
Social insurance, which in reality is health 
insurance in one form or another, is a means 
employed in most industrial countries to bring 
about a wider measure of social justice, 
without, on one hand, disturbing the institution 
of private property and its advantages to the 
Community, or, on the other, imperilling the 
thrift and industry of individuals. (King, 
1918:222).
It is not surprising then, that it was British Columbia, 
the province with the longest history in Canada of wor­
ker militancy and communist/socialist strength in its 
labour movement, that first introduced public health 
insurance in 1935 (Swartz, 1987:573; Naylor, 1986), in 
the face of growing radicalization among the unem­
ployed and a CCF opposition that represented one- 
third of voters. The legislation, passed by the B.C. 
legislature and supported by a public referendum, was 
not enacted, however. The medical profession suppor­
ted the introduction of health insurance, but only 
among the unemployed and the very poorest of wor­
kers. Business generally supported it but feared the 
costs in an already shaky provincial financial situation. 
This led the government to the unworkable compro­
mise of excluding the unemployed, thus alienating the 
doctors and failing to pacify employers' concerns about 
costs. Ultimately, the legislation was stalemated after 
being passed in the legislature.
The B.C. experience, however, was not futile in that 
it set in motion the mechanisms by which universal 
health insurance was eventually established many 
years later. For example, the case for Canada-wide 
health insurance was made by Grauer in a report for 
the 1938 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relation (Swartz, 1986:573). The B.C. Liberal, Ian 
Mackenzie, who went to Ottawa to join the King cabi­
net in 1939, began to push for a federal program of 
health insurance. A number of strikes during the early 
1940's reinforced King's fears about industrial radica­
lism and spurred him to consider health insurance 
more seriously. The CCF won 34 seats in Ontario in 
the election of 1943. Thus, by 1943, a federal govern­
ment committee headed by the Deputy Minister of 
Health, Dr. J. Heagerty, worked with the Canadian 
Medical Association to develop a model health insu­
rance bill. Costs and political finagling prevented imple­
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mentation once again, but the groundwork for health 
insurance was in place many years before the Saskat­
chewan election of 1960.
In British Columbia and Saskatchewan where the 
C CF had some sway, the health insurance idea was 
kept alive. In 1949, an inadequate hospital insurance 
scheme was enacted in British Columbia. The CCF  
election victory in 1944 led to a government with health 
insurance as its most important planned reform. By 
1947, after backing down from a plan to salary all doc­
tors in Saskatchewan, the CCF government introduced 
a successful hospital insurance plan and in 1950, 
health insurance for pensioners. In 1955, health insur­
ance was on the agenda of a federal-provincial confer­
ence at which the Premier of Ontario, Leslie Frost, 
under pressure from the unions, announced Ontario's 
interest in government hospital insurance. The newly 
formed Canadian Labour Congress declared its num­
ber one goal as being the establishment of government 
introduced universal hospital insurance. By 1960, a 
consensus had emerged, largely through the efforts of 
Mitchell Sharp at a conference on Liberal policy, that 
the federal government was committed to universal 
health insurance.
THE 1962 SASKATCHEWAN STRIKE
In Saskatchewan meantime, Tommy Douglas who had 
been Premier of Saskatchewan since 1954, won re­
election in 1960 on the campaign that medical care 
ought to not have a price tag. Despite the prevalent 
belief in Canada that medicare began with this elec­
tion, it is clear that Douglas was one of many who for 
some time in Canada saw universal health insurance 
as politically important. The Douglas government saw 
the new legislation on health insurance as "merely" an 
extension of its long-term health policies and of a pro­
gram that was already widespread, including a munici­
pal doctor scheme, an experimental medical plan in 
one region of the province, and Canada's first hospital 
insurance plan to cover everyone in a province (Bad- 
gley and Wolfe, 1967:5). However, the medical profes­
sion was immediately opposed when the program was 
announced in 1959 and its opposition grew into a 
much publicized 23 day strike in the summer of 1962. 
Analysis of the central issues involved in the 1962  
strike seems important to understanding the evolution 
of medicare in Canada, particularly since the medical 
profession had previously supported health insurance 
at various points. Understanding of the 1962 Saskat­
chewan doctors' strike is, of course, relevant to any 
analysis of the 1986 Ontario doctors' strike.
The 1962 Saskatchewan strike was not the first 
doctors' strike to occur in Canada. The first took place 
in 1933-34 in Winnipeg when doctors who were not
compensated for treating the poor, refused to provide 
anything but emergency services to the indigent (Nay­
lor, 1986). Winnipeg officials finally agreed to imple­
ment a municipal medical relief program which provi­
ded health care to the poor free of charge and 
compensated the doctors. In 1962 in Saskatchewan, 
however, the issues involved were quite different.
The medical profession that had pushed for govern­
ment involvement in health insurance and struck ear­
lier over issues of non-payment, now found itself 
against the proposal for provincial medicare in Saskat­
chewan in the late 1950's. What accounts for this? A 
number of factors emerge as important. Doctors felt 
excluded from the government's plans to implement 
medicare. For example, a 1959 committee charged 
with drafting proposals for the program was comprised 
of senior civil servants and planners, with no practising 
physicians as members (Badgley and Wolfe, 1967:24). 
This feeling of exclusion had long roots as the Presi­
dent of the Saskatchewan Medical Association com­
mented in 1944, "The Health Insurance Bill was a 
bombshell to us....it was foisted on us without 
notice....we were not consulted in this, in fact our con­
cern was resented" (Badgley and Wolfe, 1967:26). 
Despite this difficulty, by 1951, relations between the 
Douglas government and the medical associations 
were again cordial, with Dr. J.F.C. Anderson, then 
President of the Canadian Medical Association, prais­
ing Tommy Douglas for his performance as Minister of 
Health in Saskatchewan (Badgley and Wolfe, 
1967:27).
During the 1951-59 period, a number of develop­
ments set the stage for the 1962 doctors' strike. In the 
absence of a comprehensive government health insu­
rance scheme, doctors had begun their own insurance 
plans, covering up to 40 percent of the population by 
1959 (Badgley and Wolfe, 1967:27). Tensions increa­
sed between the medical people and the government 
as the government cutback on assistance to the poor, 
thereby undercutting the doctors' insurance attempts. 
The doctors felt hamstrung in their efforts. At the same 
time, the ranks of doctors in Saskatchewan were chan­
ging to include greater numbers of immigrants, many 
from Great Britain who were adamantly opposed to the 
implementation of its National Health Service after 
World W ar II. Doctors began to cluster more and more 
in Saskatchewan's cities where they were more distant 
from rural people and more open to influence by mem­
bers of their own profession. At the same time, doctors 
practising in Saskatoon felt concerned about the esta­
blishment of University Hospital in the early 1950's. 
Their worry was competition from new professionals 
being brought in to staff the medical school. The issues 
grew into a threatened boycott of the medical school 
and the new hospital by local doctors in 1954-55 (Bad­
gley and Wolfe, 1967:29), a situation not well handled
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by the government.
By the 1960 medicare election, the medical asso­
ciation of Saskatchewan was well organized and even 
had a "war chest" of funds for its public relations cam ­
paign against the government. The ideological issues 
brought out and paraded as "state-controlled medi­
cine," became the rallying cry of the doctors. The per­
sonal relationship of doctor and patient was said to be 
threatened by government health insurance (Badgley 
and Wolfe, 1967:32-34; Bitter Medicine 1, National 
Film Board). The compulsory aspects of the govern­
ment proposal for health insurance evoked images of 
"jack boots and barbed wire" for some doctors and 
opponents. Doctors, such as Alexander Robertson 
who was Chairman of the University's Department of 
Social and Preventive Medicine, were removed from 
executive office on the medical association because of 
favouring the government's proposal (Badgley and 
Wolfe, 1967:34). An advertisement appeared in seve­
ral Saskatchewan newspapers the day before the 1960  
election summarizing the doctors' concerns that "com­
pulsory state medicare" would lead to poor quality 
health care. They emphasized, however, that they 
were not opposed to prepaid medical insurance. Inter­
estingly, they reassured patients in this advertisement 
that they would always be available to attend the sick 
(Badgley and Wolfe, 1967:344-35). On 1 July 1962, 90 
percent of doctors' offices were closed. Only emergen­
cies were treated. The government had been returned 
to power with an increased majority in 1960. The doc­
tors steadfastly refused to negotiate despite their long­
standing support of their associations for government 
involvement in health insurance.
Several conclusions about the now famous 1962  
doctors' strike in Saskatchewan seem important to 
emphasize in light of the 1986 Ontario strike and the 
continuing struggle by doctors and politicians over 
Canadian health care. These sociological conclusions 
can be drawn without assessing blame, but to glean 
something about the social dynamics involved in the 
conflict. The conclusions drawn here centre on five 
themes: who know best, control, ideology, power, and 
focus. The question of who knows best was central to 
the 1962 dispute. Government took its mandate on this 
from its constituents and from expert analysts of the 
health care system. Medical professionals claimed 
their expertise from a combination of acquired know­
ledge through medical school education and their 
state-sanctioned monopoly over the provision of health 
care. In terms of control, doctors saw themselves as in 
charge of health care and resented what they saw as 
interference from the state. Government, on the other 
hand, saw itself as in control of public costs of health 
care and as being in control over public access to 
health care as a right.
In ideological terms, doctors saw themselves as a 
high status group with a moral obligation to protect the 
rights of individuals against incursions by the state. 
That this ideology was firmly supported by medical 
"refugees" from the British NHS is clear. Government, 
in contrast, saw itself as protecting people's rights to 
health care regardless of their paying capacity. The 
medical profession felt they had the power in Saskat­
chewan even two years after the people had voted 
against them on the medicare issues, to get the 
government to back down. The government felt it has 
the power to force the doctors into line without much 
consultation or compromise. In terms of focus of atten­
tion, doctors in 1962 in Saskatchewan seemed more 
attentive to their own needs than to those of their 
patients or the people they served. One doctor in an 
assessment of the strike, for example, focussed entire­
ly on what he called "casualties" to physicians, with no 
mention of the suffering people may have experienced 
as a result of the strike (Badgley and Wolfe, 1967:166). 
The government's attention was focussed on the elec­
tion and on public opinion to the exclusion of attention 
to the powerful group of doctors. Needless to say, 
these themes are by no means separate and have 
many and multiple overlaps and feedbacks.
One last conclusion about the 1962 Saskatchewan 
strike looms large in the disputes of the 1980's. In set­
tling the strike in 1962, the medical profession won 
several concessions including the right to bill patients 
directly either for the total fee or for an extra fee 
beyond that provided by provincial health insurance. 
Doctors also won the right to opt out of the government 
program if they chose. As Begin suggests, "the com­
promises reached by the Saskatchewan government in 
the settlement of the dispute shaped forever the medi­
care system that Canadians now enjoy from coast to 
coast" (Begin, 1986:87). The 1964 Hall Commission, 
on which the national system of health care in Canada 
rests, called for a universal system publicly administe­
red, comprehensive in coverage, with equal access for 
all Canadians regardless of income, and without direct 
charges to patients (Naylor, 1982:12). Fee for service 
for doctors was endorsed by the Hall Commissioners, 
but extra-billing was to be banned. In negotiations with 
the provinces, however, the extra-billing and opting out 
issue became a point of compromise with some pro­
vinces permitting it (Naylor, 1982:13).
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 
IN CANADA
To understand the central place of the medical profes­
sion in health care and the context in which disputes 
such as that of 1962 in Saskatchewan and of 1986 in 
Ontario can occur, it is necessary to explore briefly the
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conditions and circumstances under which doctors 
practice in Canada. Medicare in North America used to 
be the province of priests or shamans (and still to a 
limited extent among native people and certain ethnic 
groups). Intense competition eventually developed 
among doctors with different orientations. In particular, 
licensing of what have become known as legitimate 
medical practitioners, occurred with the founding of the 
American Medical Association in 1847 by doctors con­
cerned about improving standards of medical training, 
but also about controlling competition from "irregulars" 
who had not been trained in similar elite schools (Con­
rad and Schneider, 1986). At the heart of the founding 
of medicare as a profession is the control of markets, 
elimination of competition and the creation of a mono­
poly over health care (Conrad and Schneider, 1986; 
Friedson, 1970a:70-73; Friedson, 1970b:209-21).
Medicine is considered a profession p a r excellence, 
the epitome of a profession (Friedson, 1970b:4; Navar­
ro, 1986:243). This stems from the high regard in 
which medical practitioners are held in our society, 
from the control they have over their conditions of 
work, and from the freedom from competition they 
enjoy in the practice of their trade. There is little doubt 
that the foundation of medicine's control over its work 
is political in character, although it is also premised on 
some degree of demonstrable expertise and uniform 
standards of licensure. The medical profession suc­
ceeded through political lobbying, in gaining a monop­
oly over the provision of health care at a time when the 
status of medical doctors, achieved through recruit­
ment from the upper classes and attending the correct 
schools, far exceeded their demonstrated capacity to 
save lives or reduce mortality (Conrad and Schneider, 
1986).
Among the most treasured and carefully guarded 
characteristics of the profession of medicine is its auto­
nomy, paradoxically granted by elected legislators. The 
state must at some point grant to doctors the right to 
control the technical side of their work. As long as a 
profession is free from control by other occupations or 
professions, its ultimate lack of control from the state 
which initially grants its autonomy may never be tes­
ted. The problem, of course, is that autonomy has its 
limits in most circumstances. Once the coffers of the 
state become less beneficent, these limits emerge. 
Medicine may continue to retain autonomy over the 
conditions of its work as a profession, but be increasin­
gly asked to justify economic expenditures and social 
practices in the interest of us all. Thus, in the limits to 
professional autonomy are sown the seeds of conflict 
over control of the practice of medicine between the 
profession and duly elected legislators.
There is a crucial flaw in the granting of autonomy 
by the state to any profession. By allowing the deve­
lopment of a self-governing, high prestige profession,
the image is fostered on the part of both the members 
of the profession and of the state that the profession 
can objectively and reliably judge itself, not only on its 
actual performance, but on its performance in the eyes 
of society. A problem may be built into the system of 
self-regulation which encourages members of the pro­
fession to deceive themselves as to their objectivity 
and virtue. They may further be impeded, as a profes­
sion, from the development of improved methods of 
applying the knowledge they gain in the social interest. 
For example, lay evaluations of medical professionals 
are prevented by law. There are few limits to professio­
nal control once granted by the state. It can easily 
extend into areas such as social, economic and politi­
cal dimensions of health care on which doctors are no 
more expert than others. The limits to professional 
autonomy thus become almost boundless.
SINCE MEDICARE
By 1971 in Canada all provinces have joined medicare 
(Taylor, 1987:76). Medicare in Canada has been 
declared repeatedly by politicians of all political stripes, 
to be Canada's most successful social program (Bitter 
Medicine 1, National Film Board; Naylor, 1982; Begin, 
1986; Taylor, 1987). Public support of medicare in 
Canada is such that its discontinuation would not be 
tolerated. The national health program also had happy 
consequences for physicians as they were guaranteed 
an annual income without resorting to collection agen­
cies (Begin, 1986:87). The quality of health services 
also improved dramatically as new hospitals and new 
and better medical schools were build and more highly 
trained allied health care personnel were trained (Tay­
lor, 1987:76-84).
A further discussion of the effects of medicare on 
physicians’ incomes, seems in order since the popular 
impression, fostered by the media attention given to 
disputes between doctors and politicians, seems to be 
that physicians' incomes fell as medicare was imple­
mented. National health insurance increased physi­
cians' incomes in two central ways. First was the 
reduction or virtual elimination of bad debts by 
patients. Previously, physicians were successful in 
Canada in collecting only 60 to 75 percent of outstan­
ding bills (Begin, 1986:86). Physicians also could 
avoid the fees and time involved in attempting to have 
their bills paid through collection agencies. Secondly, 
national health insurance "levelled up" fees which had 
previously varied enormously by patients' income and 
private insurance (Marmor, 1986:449). with medicare 
providing reimbursement for 90 percent of established 
fees, physicians set their highest rates as the customa­
ry billing rate. Thus, physicians' average net earnings 
in Canada rose dramatically after the introduction of
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medicare, and, contrary to popular belief, to a much 
high level than the average incomes of their American 
counterparts (Marmor, 1986:451).
During the difficult economic period from 1971 to 
1979, doctors' incomes fell in purchasing terms, as did 
the incomes of most Canadians due to inflation, reces­
sions and other economic problems. Negotiations with 
some provincial insurance commissions led to impro­
vements in insurance reimbursements to doctors, but 
the doctors remained unsatisfied. More and more doc­
tors began to extra-bill patients to make up the diffe­
rence. Few provinces formally approved of the prac­
tice, Alberta and Nova Scotia being the exceptions, but 
ambiguity about the practice was built into the medi­
care program in its implementation. With wider extra­
billing by doctors, patients faced more out-of-pocket 
expenses and the concept of equal access to health 
care and comprehensive coverage, were being eroded 
(Naylor, 1982:13). Geographical concentration of doc­
tors who extra-billed made the option of switching doc­
tors unworkable for many patients. In some places, no 
opted-in specialists were available to serve patients 
who could not afford the extra fees.
During the same period, increasing concerns were 
being raised about two interrelated issues: overbuilding 
the hospital system and general underfunding of health 
care. Overbuilding the hospital system, it is argued, 
has led to extraordinary increases in expenditures 
(averaging 20 percent per annum, for example, in 1975  
and 1976). These escalating costs are of concern to 
politicians, doctors and the public (Taylor, 1987:84-85). 
Paralleling this concern is the one that health care fun­
ding may be losing ground relative to other spheres. 
Once the medicare system was in place, so this argu­
ment goes, it was neglected as a priority for funding. 
What some doctors feel should be spent on increasing 
their insurance reimbursements was being spent in 
other areas. In short, the image of a health care cost 
crisis was being brought into public consciousness. A 
new element in all this was the growing conviction by 
many analysts of Canadian health care that the limits 
to a high technology, treatment oriented system of 
health care had been reached (Manga, 1987; Taylor, 
1987:85). Doctors felt threatened by this concern too.
Increasing public debate eventually led the federal 
Liberal government to appoint in 1979 a special com­
missioner, Emmett Hall (the same man who had provi­
ded the groundwork for the medicare system in 1964), 
to conduct a public enquiry. The government had two 
basic questions: 1) were the provinces diverting federal 
health funds to non-health programs? and 2) were 
extra-billing by physicians and user charges violating 
the principle of reasonable access? (Taylor, 1987:87). 
The public responded with a total of 450 briefs that 
mainly approved of the system but also pointed out its 
shortcomings. The answer to the first question asked
by the government was a clear no. As for the second 
question, Hall clearly saw extra-billing as a threat to 
health care accessibility as a right (Taylor, 1987:90). 
Hall suggested introducing binding arbitration to settle 
fee disputes between medical associations and pro­
vinces. According to Begin herself who was Minister of 
Health at the time, "it became evident that legislative 
action was the only route left to correct the situation" 
(Begin, 1986:89). The new Canada Health Act was 
passed into law on 9 April 1984.
The 1984 Act cut federal transfer payments to pro­
vinces by one dollar for each dollar doctors extra-billed 
their patients. The genius of the new Act is that it put 
tough controls on extra-billing but passed responsibility 
for enforcement to the provinces. Ottawa held the 
purse strings while the law went into effect slowly over 
a period of 2-3 years. Already in 1982 when the Act 
was only in proposal form, the Canadian Medical Asso­
ciation headed then by Marc Baltzan was preparing for 
a fight. In a letter written to 36,000 member doctors in 
1982, Dr. Baltzan said that the proposed Act threate­
ned the future of health care in Canada ("Doctors Pre­
pared for a Fight" Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 20 
November 1982). The stage was set for a confronta­
tion years before the 1986 Ontario strike.
THE 1986 DOCTORS' STRIKE IN ONTARIO
The issues involved in 1986, although fresh in memo­
ry, became so highly convoluted as to be obscure to 
even to the most astute observer in the summer of 
1986. However, in the context of this brief analysis of 
the history of medicare in Canada, the 1962 strike, the 
structure of medical practice and recent developments, 
the issues become more clear. The Province of Onta­
rio had little choice in the extra billing dispute. The Pro­
vince could not afford to forgo $50 million annually in 
health transfer payments from Ottawa to appease the 
wishes (rights) of a minority (12 percent) of doctors to 
extra-bill their patients. Thus, the passing of Bill 94 (the 
ban on extra-billing) was, in fact, inevitable. Why, then, 
did the Ontario Medical Association, take the action it 
did - closing doctors’ offices, closing emergency 
departments and slowing down hospital discharges?
To some extent, the doctors were venting their 
anger at the government for perceived long-standing 
injustices, some of which have been outlined above. 
However, a few central themes emerge from the 1986 
dispute which allow us a handle on the issues invol­
ved. These include the same themes discussed earlier 
with respect to the 1962 Saskatchewan strike - who 
knows best, control, ideology, power and focus of 
attention. In the 1986 strike, some of the issues are the 
same, others have new dimensions.
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In 1986 in Ontario, the issues of who knows best 
about health care and the issue of control are inextrica­
bly bound together. Doctors, or at least their represen­
tatives in the Ontario Medical Association, believe that 
maintenance of their right to extra-bill patients allows 
them control over the way in which they practice medi­
cine. When doctors repeatedly asserted in full-page 
advertisements in newspapers and in literature and 
posters in their offices, that the issue in the strike was 
not money, they were generally correct. Money, howe­
ver, is related to the issue of control and who knows 
best, however. High status, which is directly related to 
high income, allows a freedom to decide not only what 
is best fo one's own profession, but allows those in a 
position of prestige to be listened to on what is best for 
society. Further, it is well-known in sociology that even 
within the medical profession, the more highly paid 
doctor will be taken more seriously by the patient. Doc­
tor's orders are easier to follow if the doctor is better- 
off. W e tend to be more suspicious of doctors who 
earn less and thus they can be more easily controlled. 
Doctors feared that with the banning of extra-billing, 
their control over their conditions of work was being 
eroded. They further saw Bill 94 as the edge of the 
future in government control over medicine by the state 
- hence, the rhetoric about doctors’ becoming civil ser­
vants. Along with this perceived loss of control, doctors 
might lose some of their autonomy as a profession to 
decide for society what is best for them in terms of 
health care.
The facts seem to be that the Canadian public deci­
ded in the late 1960's and early 1970's with the advent 
of medicare in Canada that access to health care was 
to be a right with no financial barriers. Public opinion 
in every year since the introduction of medicare has 
been firmly and solidly in favour. In 1984, the Cana­
dian Election Survey found some 75-90 percent of 
people in Ontario were against extra-billing (unpubli­
shed data, Canadian Election Survey). Further, in eve­
ry dispute with the medical profession since, the reso­
lution has been in favour of the government and the 
public rather than the doctors. Access to health care as 
a right among Canadians may erode doctors' autono­
my, for what is generally seen as the public good. 
However, their control over the technological practice 
of medicine remains complete, as does their right to 
set their own hours, determine how many patients to 
see, where to practice, etc. The public and the govern­
ment as a representative of the public, is deciding in 
only one realm - that of financial barriers to access - 
that it knows better than physicians. In this realm, phy­
sicians have lost some of their control, but it must be 
kept in mind in light of the history of medicare descri­
bed earlier, that the right to extra-bill was not entren­
ched in medicare. In many ways, the Canada Health 
Act of 1984, only made clear what was previously
ambiguous because of compromises rather than prin­
ciples.
In terms of ideology, the issues involved in the 1986 
strike are almost identical to those in the 1962 strike. 
Doctors' claimed in both disputes that their "freedom" 
was at stake. Essentially, the doctors saw, in both 
instances, the government as duty-bound not to inter­
fere with their rights to practice medicine. Government 
alternatively, sees access to health care as a right 
which society has an obligation to provide to all. Thus, 
the rights of doctors come into conflict with the rights of 
the public. In this case the need principle takes prece­
dence over the libertarian principle, or the freedom of 
individuals to get what they want. The greater good 
prevailed.
The power issue is an interesting one in the 1986 
Ontario strike. Most analysts seem to agree that the 
Ontario Medial Association stood virtually no chance of 
winning the dispute with the government over Bill 94. 
Public opinion was strongly against extra-billing even 
two years before the strike, the public overwhelmingly 
favoured the medicare system. The Province of Onta­
rio could not forgo $50 million annually. So why did the 
doctors assert their power in a highly contentious 
strike? In 1962, doctors felt that the government of 
Saskatchewan could be turned around, despite strong 
evidence to the contrary. In 1986 in Ontario, the con­
cept of winning became more sophisticated. A victory 
for the doctors might include more say in the future in 
the negotiations of schedules, thereby reducing the 
need to extra-bill. It might include inducing fear in the 
government over taking any further liberties with doc­
tors' autonomy. It might be simply a strong show of 
force which demonstrated to both the public and the 
government that doctors' services are vitally important. 
Lastly, it might be a means of demonstrating the power 
of collective consciousness among doctors who stood 
together, largely on this issue of extra-billing. Certainly 
it would be difficult to conclude that doctors unequivo- 
cably and totally lost in the dispute.
In terms of focus of attention, Ontario doctors in 
1986 like those in Saskatchewan in 1962, came to be 
seen as being more concerned about their professional 
rights than with the rights of the public to health care. 
Doctors, although underlining their importance as 
health care providers by their strike action, also sho­
wed that in their power as a profession, they had some 
weaknesses. They were out of touch with public opi­
nion and public need. They engaged more in consen­
sual validation of their perspectives by talking to each 
other more openly than to patients. They failed to 
realize, perhaps due to lack of exposure to social 
science perspectives in university and medical school, 
that politics matters and that patients, in their awe and 
fear of medical practitioners, will do and say one thing 
in a doctor's office and quite another when voting or
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expressing opinions to a pollster.
THE CENTRALITY OF HEALTH CARE ACCESS AS 
A RIGHT
The 1986 Ontario doctors’ strike and the developments 
that lead to it highlight some important public health 
care issues in Canada. Clearly, doctors were fighting a 
battle that they lost in many respects. W hat did we 
learn and gain from the experience?
Medicare is clearly an enormously popular program 
in Canada. Its basic tenets of equal access, compre­
hensiveness, universality, public administration can 
only be violated at the political peril of those who tam ­
per with it. Yet, medicare is not completely secure in 
Canada in the late 1980's. The infrastructure on which 
it rests was revealed as being highly political, the pro­
duct of compromise, pressure and ambiguous settle­
ment in both the long and recent past. Much of what 
occurs in the future with medicare, like so many other 
areas in Canada, will happen not because of the public 
will to change it but rather because of political machi­
nery set in motion long ago including federal-provincial 
relations. The uneasy political equilibrium on which 
medicare is permitted will require an enormous expen­
diture of energy to maintain.
About the medical profession, we have learned 
once again that this is a very highly paid autonomous 
profession group whose services are essential to our 
well-being. In watching the limits to the power and 
autonomy of the medical profession, we have learned 
an extraordinary amount about their power and indis­
pensability as well. The extent of their freedom to prac­
tice medicine also became fully visible in the 1986 
strike, another paradox. The extent to which the public, 
the government and doctors themselves view medicine 
as an elite came clearly into focus in the summer of 
1986. Doctors put on an impressive show of what 
some term petulance (McQuaig, 1986:7) without being 
legislated back to work, when some other less power­
ful, but no less essential, occupations and profession 
such as nurses, teachers, bus drivers, postal workers 
and garbage collectors are denounced as greedy but 
indispensable, and forced back to work. In ideological 
terms, the gap between the perspectives of doctors 
and those of the public emerged as fundamentally dif­
ferent. The strong free enterprise and libertarian orien­
tation among the doctors provides an important con­
trast with the more collectivist, rights orientation among 
the Canadian public.
A fundamental, indelible lesson from the 1986 Onta­
rio strike, however, is that the public in Canada, as 
indicated by the passage of the 1984 Canada Health 
Act, reaffirmed health care as a right. Health care for 
Canadians can never be again a privilege of the rich.
Reassertion of this right in the face of opposition by a 
powerful profession, forces us as Canadians to the 
conclusion that health is a basic human need. In order 
for us to be granted the means to have this need 
meant, society must reconcile the sometimes conflic­
ting needs of doctors and the public. Health care  pro­
fessionals are seen to have a societal and public duty 
to provide care, a duty that transcends the require­
ments of any profession, but one that should be an 
essential component of good medical practice.
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